# Refutation of fuzzy logic

Colin James III Ersatz Systems Machine Cognition, LLC [ESMC] Colorado Springs, USA ersatz-systems.com

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Abstract—We evaluate eight seminal conjectures of fuzzy logic for sets, logic, operators, axioms, Z-numbers, intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, and neutrosophic logic. These are *not* tautologous, to form a fragment of the universal logic V $\pm$ 4.

Keywords—fuzzy axiom, fuzzy logic, fuzzy operator, fuzzy set, intuitionistic logic, Meth8/VŁ4, modal operator, modern square of opposition, Modus Cesare, Modus Camestros, neutrosophic logic, paraconsistent logic, syllogism, quantifier

### I. INTRODUCTION

This paper evaluates five seminal aspects of fuzzy logic. These include sets, logic, operators, axioms, and Z-numbers. Fuzzy sets are pseudo-triangular bases. Fuzzy logic is in *one* variable from a "historical" context. Fuzzy operators are from intuitionistic soft sets. Fuzzy axioms are from preference relations. Fuzzy Z-numbers are measured for resolution and symmetry. Fuzzy logics by three extensions apply to intuitionistic, paraconsistent, and neurtrosophic logics, with the last claimed as a generaliztion of the previous.

We use our resuscitation of the four-valued modal logic of  $\pounds$ ukasiewicz<sup>1</sup> The modal logic model checker named Meth8/ V $\pounds$ 4 implents the universal logic V $\pounds$ 4<sup>2</sup>. A student demo for two variables and unlimited sequents is free by request.

Symbolic values in VŁ4 are presented to replicate results.

2 After proof of modal operators as respective quantifiers, two recent advances followed. The Modern Square of Opposition adopted new formulas for vertices and edges. These in turn validated the 24-syllogisms, to make minor corrections to Modus Cesare and Camestros. Further proofs cascaded to refute the Löb axiom  $\Box(\Box p > p) > \Box p$ , disallowing Gödel logic as a quantum basis, and the axiom of the empty set, disqualifying ZFC as a mathematical foundation. The model version of ML<sub>4</sub> became the universal logic system named variant VL4.

```
~ Not; + Or; - Not Or; & And; \ Not And;
> Imply, greater than; < Not Imply, less than;
= Equivalent; @ Not Equivalent;
% possibility, for one; # necessity, for all;
(z=z)
       T as tautology, ordinal 3, binary 11;
(z@z)
       F as contradiction, zero,
                                  binarv 00;
(%z>#z) N as truthity, ordinal 1,
                                  binary 01:
(%z<#z) C as falsity, ordinal 2,
                                  binary 10;
~(y < x) as (x \le y), (x \subseteq y).
Quantifiers are distributed onto variables.
Model 1
          Models 2
 - - -
           - - - - - - -
          M21 M22 M231 M232
 M1
  # %
           # % # % # % # %
F.F.C.
       U. UU UE UP
                         UΤ
C.F C
                    ΙE
        I. I I
               UΕ
                         υI
N.N T
        P. P P U E
                    UΡ
                         ΡΕ
       E. E E U E
T.N T
                    ΙE
                         ΡΕ
Model 1 connectives as table rows 1-4 from left.
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#### II. FUZZY COMPONENTS

We test fuzzy set, logic, operator, axiom, and Z-number.

### A. Fuzzy sets

Pseudo triangular bases of fuzzy sets[2]

2. Properties of fuzzy sets, Lemma 2.1. A fuzzy set f:  $[0,1] \rightarrow [0,1]$  is min-convex if, and only if, for any  $0 \le x < z < y \le 1$  we have that if f(z) < f(x) then  $f(y) \le f(z)$ . Moreover, it is strictly min-convex if, and only if, for any  $0 \le x < z < y \le 1$  we have that if  $f(z) \le f(x)$  then  $f(y) \le f(z)$ . Proof. This is a straightforward verification. (2.1.2.1)

**Remark 2.1.2.2:** Distributing the universal quantifier on variables in the antecedent produces the same truth table result.

Eq. 2.1.2.2 as rendered is *not* tautologous, hence refuting strictly min-convex and subsequent conjectures, constituting the briefest refutation of fuzzy logic.

<sup>1</sup> A trivial objection to Łukasiewicz  $M_4$  is  $(\Diamond p \& \Diamond q) \rightarrow \Diamond (p \& q)$ . For example if Schrödinger's cat is p for alive or q for dead, the sentence reads: If possibly the cat is alive and possibly the cat is dead, then possibly the cat is dead and alive. This is tautologous in Meth8/VŁ4, but *hard-wired* as not tautologous in assistants as Molle and Prover9. The easy answer is casting the dual of  $\Diamond p, \Diamond q$  to a reduced, single variable dual of  $\Diamond p, \sim \Diamond p$ for  $(\Diamond p \& \sim \Diamond p) \rightarrow \Diamond (p \& \sim p)$  to read: If possibly the cat is alive and not possibly the cat is alive, then possibly the cat is alive and not alive. This is tautologous in the provers listed.

## B. Fuzzy logic

**Refutation in one variable of the historical basis for** fuzzy logic[4]

However the proposition "possible p" is not the same as p (1.1), and "possible  $\neg p$ " is not the negation of "possible p" (2.1). Hence the fact that the proposition "possible p"  $\land$  "possible  $\neg p$ " may be true (3.1) does not question the law of non-contradiction since "possible p" and "possible  $\neg p$ " are not mutually exclusive (4.1). This situation leads to interpretation problems for a fully truth-functional calculus of possibility, since even if p is "possible" and  $\neg p$  is "possible", still p  $\land \neg p$  is ever false (5.1).

%p@p;	$C\mathbf{F}C\mathbf{F}$	$C\mathbf{F}C\mathbf{F}$	$C\mathbf{F}C\mathbf{F}$	CFCF	(1.2)	
%~p=~%p;	NNNN	NNNN	NNNN	NNNN	(2.2)	
(%p&%~p)=%(p=p);						
	CCCC	CCCC	CCCC	CCCC	(3.2)	
~(%p@~p)=(p=p);						
	$C\mathbf{F}C\mathbf{F}$	$C\mathbf{F}C\mathbf{F}$	CFCF	CFCF	(4.2)	
(%p&%~p)>(p&~p) ;						
	NNNN	NNNN	NNNN	NNNN	(5.2)	

**Remark:** Eqs. 1.2-5.2 are *not* tautologous. Hence an historical basis for fuzzy logic is refuted, and in one variable.

## C. Fuzzy operators

First Zadeh's logical operators on intuitionistic fuzzy soft set[1]

**Definition 2.7.** ... [T]he union of (F,A) and (G,B) is denoted by '(F,A) $\cup$ (G,B)' and is defined by (F,A)  $\cup$  (G,B)=(H,C), where C=A $\cup$ B ... (2.7.1)

LET p, q, r, s, t, u: A, B, C, F, G, H. (r=(p+q))>(((s&p)+(t&q))=(u&r)); TTTT TT**FF** TTTT T**FFF** ... (2.7.2)

## **3.2.** First Zadeh's intuitionistic fuzzy conjunction of intuitionistic fuzzy soft set

<b>Example 3.2.2.</b> (F,A) $\tilde{\wedge}_z(G,B)=(H,C)$ , where C=A $\cap$ B
(r=(p&q))>(((s&p)\(t&q))=(u&r)); <b>FFF</b> T TTT <b>F FFF</b> T TTT <b>F</b> (3.2.2.2)
<b>Proposition 3.2. 3.</b> (F,A) $\tilde{\wedge}_{z,1}$ (G,B) <sub>z,1</sub> →(H,C)⊇ [(F,A) <sub>z,1</sub> →(H,C)] $\tilde{\wedge}_{z,1}$ [(G,B) <sub>z,1</sub> →(H,C)] (3.2.3.1)
$ \begin{array}{cccc} ((s\&p)\(t\&q)) > & ((((s\&p)>(t\&q))\)((t\&q)>(u\&r))) < (u\&r)) ; \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & $
<b>Example 3.3.2.</b> (F,A) $\tilde{\lor}_{z,1}$ (G,B)=(H,C), where C=A $\cap$ B (3.3.2.1)
(r=(p&q))>(((s&p)-(t&q))=(u&r)); FFFT TTTT FTFT TTTF (3.3.2.2)
<b>Example 3.3.6.</b> It is obviously that $(F,A)\tilde{\wedge}_{z,1}(G,B)\neq (G,B)\tilde{\wedge}_{z,1}(F,A)$ (3.3.6.1)

((s&p)\(t&q))@((t&q)\(s&p)); FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF (3.3.6.2) Because the above definition and example as rendered are not tautologous, First Zadeh's logical operators on intuitionistic logic fuzzy soft set is refuted.

### D. Fuzzy axioms

## Axiomatizing logics of fuzzy preferences[8]

**2.** Preliminaries on fuzzy preference relations ... [W]e will assume that a weak A-valued preference relation on a set U will be now a fuzzy  $\land$ -preorder P : U ×U  $\rightarrow$  A, where P(a, b) is interpreted as the degree in which v is at least as preferred as u, that is, satisfying ...  $\land$ -transitivity: P(u,v) $\land$ P(v,w) $\leq$ P(u,w) for each u,v,w $\in$ U (2.5.1)

**Remark 2.5.1:** We ignore the subset clause for evaluation of the assumed  $\wedge$ -transitivity theorem.

LET p, q, r, s: P, u, v, w.  

$$\sim ((p\&(q\&s)) < ((p\&(q\&r))\&(p\&(r\&s)))) = (p=p);$$
  
TTTT TTTT TTT**F** TTTT (2.5.2)

**Remark 2.5.2:** Eq. 2.5.2 as rendered is *not* tautologous. This also refutes subsequent conjectures in the text, notably, the minimal modal logics of a finite residuated lattice and the Bulldozed method.

## E. Z-numbers

## Refutation of measures for resolution and symmetry in fuzzy logic of Zadeh Z-numbers[3]

Proof. Assume the fuzziness measure, H, ... For G3 [resolution], denoted A \* = (A \*, B \*), where A \*, B \* are [a] sharpened version of A and B, respectively. So  $H(A) \ge H(A *)$  and  $H(B) \ge H(B *)$ , therefore  $H(A)+H(B) \ge H(A *)+H(B *)$ ) >  $H(Z) \ge H(Z *)$ . (3.1)

LET p, q, r, s: A, B, H, Z;  $(\sim((r\&p)<(r\&\#p))\&\sim((r\&q)<(r\&\#q))) > (\sim(((r\&p)+(r\&\#q)))<((r\&\#p)+(r\&\#q)))> ((r\&s)<(r\&\#s)));$ TTTT TTTT TTTT NTTT (3.2)

For G4, [symmetry] H(A)=H(1-A) and H(B)=H(1-B), so H(A)+H(B)=(H(1-A))+(H(1-B))) > Z(Z)=HZ(Z(1-A,1-B)).(4.1)

 $\begin{array}{l} (((r\&p)=(r\&((\%p>\#p)-p)))\&((r\&q)=(r\&((\%p>\#p)-q)))) > \\ ((((r\&p)+(r\&q))=((r\&((\%p>\#p)-p))+(r\&((\%p>\#p)-q)))) > \\ (((r\&s)\&s)=((r\&s)\&(s\&((((\%p>\#p)-p)\&((\%p>\#p)-q))))) ; \\ \\ & \texttt{TTTT} \texttt{TTTT} \texttt{TTTT} \texttt{CTTT} (4.2) \end{array}$ 

Eqs. 3.2 and 4.2 as rendered are *not* tautologous. This means the commonly accepted measures G3 (resolution) and G4 (symmetry) for the Zadeh (Z-numbers) fuzzy logic are refuted.

## III. RELATED LOGICS

We test fuzzy logic as often related to intuitionistic, parconsistent, and neutrosophic logics.

### A. Intuitionistic logic

**Contra intuitionistic logic**[6]

Intuitionistic logic is not based on the *a priori* existence of truth values (although it is possible to give a truth values semantics for it, for example, via Heyting algebras or Kripke frames). (1.1)

In intuitionistic logic the meaning of a connective is given by describing how a proof of the compound formula can be obtained from proofs of the constituents. (2.1)

**Remark 1.1:** Eq. 1.1 means a universal, designated proof value does not exist, hence rendering intuitionistic logic without an exact bivalent solution and forcing it into a probabilisitic vector space, equivalent to an inexact guess.

**Remark 2.1:** Eq. 2.1 means a connective cannot be consistent between proofs and further implies a connective has no truth table. Therefore coupled with Eq. 1.1, this represents the briefest refutation of intuitionistic logic known.

## B. Paraconsistent logic

### **Refutation of paraconsistent logic on one conjecture**[5]

[To prove the seminal equivalence and replacement formula of paraconsistent logic is]

(4) To establish that a formula  $\Gamma$  is equivalent to  $\Delta$  in the sense that either can be substituted for the other wherever they appear as a subformula, one must show

$$((\Gamma \to \Delta) \land (\Delta \to \Gamma)) \land ((\neg \Gamma \to \neg \Delta) \land (\neg \Delta \to \neg \Gamma)).$$
(4.1)  
LET p, q:  $\Gamma, \Delta.$   
$$((\neg \Delta \to \gamma)) \& ((\neg \Sigma \to \gamma)) \& ((\neg \Sigma \to \gamma)) :$$

 $\begin{array}{ll} ((p > q) \& (q > p)) \& ((\sim p > \sim q) \& (\sim q > \sim p)); \\ & & & \\ &$ 

**Remark 4.2:** Eq. 4.2 as rendered is *not* tautologous. This refutes the seminal theorem of replacement and serves as the briefest refutation of paraconsistent logic known

### C. Neutrosophic logic

## Refutation of neutrosophic logic as generalization of intuitionistic, fuzzy logic[7]

For neutrosophic logic (N), we map the respective values of truth, falsity, and indeterminacy as:

We simplify our evaluation by ignoring the numeric scaling factor of  $\varepsilon$ . That serves to push a single numeric value of the combined, summed state of Nt+Ni+Nf outside an interval definition of q on "]0,1[" and into "]0,3[", or ultimately to natural numbers, including zero.

$$\begin{array}{l} \#(((q^{(p-p))}\&(q^{(p/p)}))+((q^{(p-p)})+(q^{(p/p)}))) > \\ \%(q^{(((%p)=\mu)+((%p<\mu))+((%p>\mu)+((%p<\mu))))); \\ \text{TCTT TCTT TCTT TCTT } \end{array} (1.2)$$

In Eq. 1.2: the antecedent establishes the necessity of  $0 \le q \le 1$ ; the consequent establishes the possibility that q is the

summation of Nt+Ni+Nf; and the result of the sentence is *not* tautologous, meaning neutrosophic logic is refuted and hence its use as a generalization of intuitionistic, fuzzy logic is likewise unworkable.

We expand our evaluation by including more neutrosophic values for absolute truth +1, absolute falsity -0, and absolute indeterminacy on the interval written "]-0,1+[", as respectively:

N+t (#p > #p); N+f (#p < #p); N+i ((( $\#p > \#p) + (\#p < \#p)) + \sim ((\#p > \#p) + (\#p < \#p))$ ). (2.1)

We substitute values of Eq. 2.1 into Eq. 1.2.

 $\begin{array}{l} \#(((q<(p-p))\&(q>(p\setminus p)))+((q=(p-p))+(q=(p\setminus p))))>\%\\ (q=(((\#p>\#p)+(\#p<\#p))+\sim((\#p>\#p)+(\#p<\#p))));\\ & \text{TCTT TCTT TCTT TCTT} \end{array} (2.2) \end{array}$ 

In Eq. 2.2: the antecedent establishes the necessity of  $1 \le q \le 0$ ; the consequent establishes the possibility that q is the summation of (N+t)+(N+i)+(N+f); and the result of the sentence is *not* tautologous, with the same table result as in Eq. 1.2. Therefore neutrosophic logic as a generalization to include intutionistic and paraconsistent logics is unworkable.

## IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

We tested equations for 19 conjectures which are *not* tautologous. This refutes eight aspects of fuzzy logic and its derivatives. These results form a non tautologous fragment of the universal logic VŁ4.

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